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ABSTRACT 
Some of prior studies posit that a collaborative management approach is the most suitable way to 
manage common-pool resources, including tuna resources, because it engages those who use 
the resources in the management process. Unfortunately, the approach has not been found 
effective in managing migratory tuna resources of the Western Central Pacific Ocean. Taking a 
case study approach, we investigated the collaborative management approach model taken by 
Western Central Pacific Ocean Commission and identified the root causes of the key issues in 
managing the resources. This study contributes to a better understanding of issues in 
managing common-pool resources, which may help policy-makers develop effective 
strategies for the sustainable management of the resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies show that the world’s fisheries as a common-pool resource are threatened by overharvesting 
and are facing serious challenges of depletion (e.g. Costello et al. 2016). The culmination of the several 
factors such as: increased fishing activities, increased vessels’ capacities, improved fishing efficiency 
compounded with high rate of illegally, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, have 
attributed to the overharvesting and depletion (ABC, 2016, WCPFC, 2016). Additionally, fishing in 
closed areas, violations of fishing licence rules, illegal discards (dumping untargeted species 
overboard), and misreporting of catch have all resulted in virtual extinction of certain tuna species, 
plundering of the fisheries, and loss of revenue for the Pacific Island countries1 (PICs) (MRAG, 2016). 
The Marine Resources Assessment Group’s Report, based on data obtained from 2010 – 2015, indicates 
                                                          
1 Pacific island countries (PICs), commonly known as small islands developing states, have limited land landmass 
(with the exception of Papua New Guinea), with few natural resources, but they control the largest ocean area in 
the world. 
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that between 276,500 mt and 338,400 mt of tuna were caught through IUU fishing activities over the 
past six years. This has contributed to a loss in revenue to PICs of USD 123 million per year (MRAG, 
2016). 
The problems compel policy advocates, scholars, and others to search for effective solutions. In the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)1, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) 
and coastal states are struggling to manage their tuna resources (ABC, 2016). The WCPO is the only 
ocean region that still has tuna stocks. However, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC), is facing difficulties in managing the divergent interests of its members over 
tuna fisheries. The region witnesses the depletion of species such as big eye and blue fin tuna, and 
overharvesting of the other species (ABC, 2016). The problem raises the question about the collaborative 
management approach (CMA) taken by the WCPFC.  
Collaborative management approach (CMA) is generally defined as a working practice whereby 
individuals work together for a common purpose (Ansell and Gash, 2007). The basic principle of 
CMA, based on the study of Colebatch and Larmour (1993), are that members behave according to 
their group’s norms and take collective actions to achieve their goals. It operates within the 
framework of the attributes: partnership, cooperation, participation, shared interests, collective 
responsibilities, mutual trust, social capital and consensus based decisions (Marttunen and 
Hämäläinen, 2008). 
Earlier studies on the management of common pool resources (CPRs) have asserted that CMA is most 
suitable to CPRs (such as fisheries, rivers, minerals, meadows, forestry, etc.) including tuna resources 
because it involves those who use the resources in the management process (e.g. Acheson, 2013, 
Hauzer et al., 2013). One of the main advantages for involving the resource users is that every member 
takes part in the decision making process which, in turn, instils a sense of ownership among the users, 
and motivates them to use the resources more responsibly (Ostrom, 2015). Fulton (2011) asserted that 
one of the key components for the successful management of fisheries is the inclusion of stakeholders 
in the management process known as “participatory management” (p.10). In terms of the WCPFC, 
such a management approach involves 26 member countries, cooperating non-members, participating 
territories and stakeholders such as non-government organizations (NGOs), fishing industries, 
RFMOs and sub-RFMOs, making it a potentially complex management structure.  
While CMA may work well with the management of some of traditional coastal fisheries in Pacific 
Islands, known as community based fisheries management (Moses, 2016), the effectiveness of the 
approach elsewhere involving regional and international actors such as the WCPFC remains 
questionable (Hanich and Tsamenyi, 2014, Norris, 2015). 
                                                          
1 This is the region stretching from Indonesia and the Philippines in the west, to Hawaii, Kiribati and French 
Polynesia in the east, and from the southern oceans at 55 degrees south to the waters of the Arctic in the north. 
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This study therefore seeks to examine the factors influencing the outcomes of the CMA and explore 
the root causes for the failure of WCPFC in managing tuna fisheries in WCPO. The study has practical 
implications for managing other common-pool resources.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on the (perceived or realised) benefits and outcomes of CMA, and the 
factors influencing CMA outcomes. We conducted a comprehensive and structured literature review 
on the topic areas. Most of the reviewed articles were published in leading scholarly journals, being 
peer reviewed and recorded most citations. The majority of journals reviewed were published 
between the years 2000 to 2015 to capture a reasonably current state of understanding on the topical 
areas. However, other journal articles published three to five decades ago have also been reviewed. 
Indeed, many of the earlier authors were eminent in this field, for example Elinor Ostrom was the 
joint Nobel Prize winner in 2009 in Economic Science (Anderies and Janssen, 2012), as well as others 
including Hofstede, Axelrod, and Nash. These same authors turn up as references in many of the 
more recent articles on the topic.  
The major databased used to search the articles for the review include Pro-Quest, EbscoHost, Emerald, 
AQORA and JSTOR. These databases provide a balance of conceptual and empirical account in the 
areas of study. The key search words were selected based on their importance in the study field, 
including management of CPRs, collaborative management, co-management and common-property 
rights; collective action, and community based fisheries management (CBFM). Most of these terms 
were used interchangeably because they have similar meanings as they operate on the same 
management principles within the framework of partnership, cooperation, shared interests, collective 
responsibilities, mutual trust, and consensus based decisions. The search criteria included (1) articles 
were published between 2000 and 2015; (2) articles must have at least 50 citations; (3) articles must be 
peer reviewed; and (4) articles must be related to the management of CPRs. The number of articles 
analysed was also determined by the timeframe given to carry out the study, and the point of 
saturation reached from the information gathered (Kirriemuir and McFarlane, 2004). As a result, a 
total of 68 publications were selected for this review. Table 1 presents a brief summary of the basic 
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Year (& No.) 
of 
publication 
Type of study Methodology  Geography 
 












1990s 9 Conceptual 22 Qualitative 6 Central 
America 
1 Structures 6 Fisheries 
onshore 
9 




1 Efficiency 4 Fisheries 
offshore 
0 
1970s 1   Ethnographic 12 Europe 12 Outcomes & 
Results 
10 Agriculture 1 
1960s 1   Experimental 8 Asia 11 CMA 
Theories 
3 Unspecified 35 
1950s 1   Conceptual 22 Africa 8     
      Pacific 2     
Table 1.  Summary of basic features of the articles (N=68) reviewed 
*Note: Common-pool resources (CPRs):  natural resources refers to forests, wildlife, ponds, rivers, and 
minerals; fisheries onshore refers to fisheries on the coast; fisheries offshore refers to fish in the deep ocean 
far from the coast (mostly pelagic, or migratory species); and agriculture refers to irrigation systems 
and pastures.  
Given the purpose of this study, we presents a brief summary of the findings of our literature review 
as follows. 
Benefits of Collaborative Management Approach 
Our literature review finds that collaborative management approach (CMA) has both  perceived 
benefits (e.g. Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005; Berkes, 2009) and realized benefits (e.g. Cheng and Sturtvant, 
2012) in the management of  CPRs. Research shows that CMA can offer a number of benefits such as: 
(1) common goal – group members share similar aims or desired results; (2) prevents conflicts by 
helping members to interact and solve their differences (Sa-Ngiamlak et al., 2011); (3) social learning – 
it enables group members to learn from each other’s needs, perspectives and positions and thus 
promotes greater knowledge and understanding among members (Marttunen and Hämäläinen, 2008, 
Richie et al., 2012); (4) better relationship – it improves members’ relationships and cultivates 
partnership; (5) mutual trust – it increases trust among members (Bruckmeier and Larsen, 2008, 
Caldwell et al., 2009); (6) participatory decision makings  - all the stakeholders are involved in the 
decisions, and the decisions are often made through consensus. Hence, a group tends to take 
ownership of the collective decisions, increasing their commitment to their objectives; (7) integrated 
management – members share resources and responsibilities, which enhances unity by bringing 
together different groups under a single framework (Olaru et al., 2014, Munoz-Erickson et al., 2010); 
(8) mutual respect – it fosters respect among members (Richie et al., 2012); (9) collective benefits – all 
stakeholders benefit from the outcomes (Espinoza-Tenorio et al., 2012). 
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Outcomes of Collaborative Management Approach 
Although the majority of the literature that we reviewed has asserted the effectiveness of CMA in 
terms of the efficiency and equity in managing CPRs, scholars such as Agrawal (2003), and Grafton et 
al. (2006)  amongst others have reported some negative results in their research findings in terms of 
cooperation towards the sustainability of CPRs. We find that out of the 10 empirical studies reviewed 
with a focus on the outcomes of CMA, about 40 percent of them, mostly in America, USA, Africa and 
Europe reported a negative outcome, due to various factors (to be discussed in the next section). 
Despite the negative outcomes, the majority of scholars are optimistic that the weaknesses can be 
addressed, and have suggested ways for improvements. Moreover, most of them indicate that CMA is 
ideal for CPRs (e.g. Mutimukuru, 2010, Boateng, 2006). Reynard (2002) and Masomera (2002) have 
argued that there is no one-size fits all approach, and the optimum management structure and 
approach must be context-based. 
 
Factors influencing Collaborative Management Approach Outcomes 
Our literature review finds that for a CMA to be successful in managing CPRs it has to meet certain 
favourable conditions including (i) equal power distribution among members, (ii) strong common 
interest (iii) certain cultural orientations (predominantly communalism, femininity and long-term 
orientations), (iv) fair endowment, (v) high-level of cooperation; (vi) strong leadership style, (vii) low 
to moderate transaction costs, (viii) incentives, (vix) clarity of rules, (x) small size groups (rather than 
large ones) and (xi) self-enforcement compounded with external enforcement. In terms of power 
distribution, Gallardo et al. (2013) argues that CMA does not guarantee a uniform egalitarian 
partnership in practice. There are different sources of power held by individuals within a CMA group. 
The two highlighted by scholars of most relevance to this study are political and economic powers 
(Acheson, 2013; Davis and Ruddle, 2012). Another factor that influences CMA outcomes is self-interest 
vs common interest (e.g. Acheson, 2013). CMA is intended to achieve organisational objectives and to 
benefit all members collectively. However, this may not occur if most members tend to value their 
own interests above the group’s interests and opt for personal benefit once they see the opportunity, 
or if the group benefit is less than the individual one (Colebatch and Larmour, 1993). Cultural 
orientations have been found influencing the outcomes of CMA (e.g. Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009, 
Pinel, 2013). Human behaviors are pre-dominantly influenced by cultures (norms, beliefs and values) 
(Hofstede et al. 1991). Mansbridge (1990, p.64), noted that “… not all cultures promote the same 
behaviour ...” which can be very challenging in international and regional institutions where members 
have different cultural values and orientations. In terms of endowment, if members endow their 
financial contributions to an association such as WPCFC, they tend to take more ownership, increase 
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loyalty and commitment to the objectives of the organization. This is because they have invested their 
money into the organization (Ostrom, 1999). Managing highly migratory CPRs such as tuna fisheries 
in an open-access or free-for-all area requires strong cooperation among member countries, fishing 
industries and stakeholders. Hence, the level of cooperation is found to affect the outcomes of CMA 
(McGuire, 2006). Leadership is found to affect the outcomes of CMA in CPRs management (e.g. Cheng 
and Sturtevant, 2012). For example, a participatory approach taken by a leader is important in matters 
such as decision-making, the enactment of laws, the development of policies, and by listening to the 
views of members and helping them come up with sound decisions (e.g. Marttunen and Hämäläinen, 
2008). Transaction cost is found to be another factor influencing the outcomes of CMA (e.g. Dyer, 1997). 
In the context of tuna fisheries in WCPO, the transaction costs can be the costs involved in trying to 
comply with the conservation management measures. Incentive is found to influence positively CMA 
outcomes and have been used as a tool to encourage compliance with rules in the appropriation of 
CPRs (e.g. Hanich et al., 2015). In the context of CPRs, rules are normally set by members of a group 
(communities) that use or harvest the resources. Studies show that the enactment depends on the 
clarity of the rules (e.g. Xepapadeas, 2005). The size of group is also found to affect the outcomes of 
CMA. Olson (2009) argues that the larger the group the less it will further its common interest. CMA 
outcomes can also be influenced by the effectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement of rules. 
Studies show that monitoring and enforcements of rules on CPRs are often problematic due to lack of 
resources, under capacity, and no follow-up (e.g. Reaves and Bauer, 2012).  
The prior research discussed above about collaborative management approach in managing common-
pool resources is informative and serves as a framework for our study. However, we also identify 
some research gaps from the literature review.    
 
Major research gaps 
This section discusses the major knowledge gaps. As showed in Table 1, the majority of the studies 
have been originated from North America (33), Europe (12) and Asia (11). Only two studies tackle the 
issues in the Pacific region, and these involve Australia and New Zealand only. However, the majority 
of countries in the Pacific region are small Pacific Island countries (PICs). None of the studies we 
reviewed touches on the issues in the context of the PICs. We argue that the context of studies places 
an important role to the conclusions of research findings and the generalisation of new knowledge or 
theory. Factors such as beliefs, attitude, socio-cultural, economics, and political environments play a 
key role in influencing how societies (or communities) behave and interpret their situations 
(Podsakoff et al., 2012). Furthermore, most of the literature available examines the management of 
natural resources and coastal fisheries. These are the CPRs that are localised in a single geographical 
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area shared by a community within that vicinity. However, none of the studies discusses migratory 
CPRs such as tuna fisheries which are managed by countries from a region and distant water fishing 
nations (DWFNs). The management of migratory CPRs presents a serious challenge as it involves 
different sovereign states. It also involves different actors with different level of powers (e.g. Coastal 
States and DWFNs) that are subject to different sovereign laws and national interests. These are the 
dynamics that are inadequately taken on board in prior studies, arguably leading to another 
knowledge gap. We seek to address the knowledge gaps while taking into account what has been 
done in the prior studies and their findings on the topic area.  
METHODS 
Case study design 
This study follows a case study design as it is the preferred strategy when how or why questions are 
being investigated (Yin, 1994). A case study is useful when in-depth explanations of social behaviour 
are sought (Zainal, 2007) and when examination of data is conducted within the context of its use (Yin, 
1994). We selected the WCPFC as a unit of analysis and investigated how it managed tuna resources – 
a CPR in the Western Central Pacific Ocean and the root causes for failing to do so.  We selected 
WCPFC as a case organization because the WCPFC serves as a classic example of using CMA in 
managing CPRs at both regional and international levels and the findings of this study should have 
wider implications for the studies of CPR management. 
The WCPFC was established in 2004, principally to manage tuna stocks in the high seas. It consists of 
26 member countries: mostly the Pacific Islands Forum members (PIFs) including Australia, New 
Zealand and 14 PICs, and Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) including Canada, USA, EU, 
China, Chinese Taipei, Republic of Korea and coastal states such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
WCPFC is intended to operate under a legally binding framework founded on collaborative principles 
based on collective responsibility and collective benefits (WCPFC, 2013). 
 
Data collection and analysis 
We conducted semi-structured and face-to-face interviews to collect interviewees’ insights into the 
CMA practices in the WCPFC, the outcomes, and factors influencing the outcomes. Offshore tuna 
fisheries in the WCPFC is a sensitive issue, with government representatives from member countries 
hesitant to reveal information about their governments’ position or their opinions. Using face-to-face 
interviews offers the opportunity to break the barrier because on most occasions discussions begin on 
the surface of the subject and then develop further into the core of the issue once trust is developed 
(Holbrook et al., 2003). The key questions that we asked include: 
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- How is the collaborative management approach used by the WCPFC to manage tuna 
resources in the region?  
- What do you think are the main factors that have attributed to the rapid decline of tuna 
resources in the region?  
Using a purposive sampling technique, we selected the potential participants in our 
interviews, targeting at the key senior fisheries officers representing the 26 member countries of 
WCPFC. Most of them hold important responsibilities in their countries such as CEOs, directors, 
deputy directors, permanent secretaries, and senior fisheries officers, and who were usually the 
gatekeepers holding most of the management information about the tuna fisheries. In an attempt to 
gain comprehensive insight into the WCPFC’s CMA issues, we also sought cross sectional viewpoints 
from potential informants holding different responsibilities. For example, officials who were engaged 
in monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) of the tuna fisheries were also interviewed. Likewise, 
we also interviewed representatives of fishing industries, scientists, and NGOs. As a result, we 
interviewed a total of 40 key informants. (All interviewees requested anonymity prior to the 
interviews, therefore as part of keeping that confidentiality, we are unable to provide further 
demographic data about the participants in our interviews). The interviews took between 30 minutes 
to 1 hour depending on the availability of the interviewees. All the interviews were recorded after 
obtaining the consent from the interviewees. English was used in all the interviews. 
We used NVIVO software to help analyse our interview data by classifying, sorting and arranging 
information gathered into their respective themes. It also helped in concept-mapping to examine the 
relationship between concepts. We used a thematic data analysis to identify and categorize themes. 
The following section presents our analysis and discussion of the findings.  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Failure of CMA of WCPFC 
Prompted by the recommendation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 
1982), the WCPFC was established to implement a collaborative management approach (CMA) to manage 
the tuna resources of the Western Central Pacific Ocean. However, the tuna resources in the region 
have been declining and some of the species are facing extinction, which sends a serious warning that 
the whole tuna fisheries in the region could be depleted in the not too distant future (ABC, 2016). 
Increased fishing activities, increased vessel capacities, improved fishing efficiency compounded with 
high rate of illegally, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, have culminated in 
overharvesting of the tuna fisheries. IUU fishing activities have led to overharvesting, virtual 
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extinction of certain tuna species, plundering of the fisheries, and loss of revenue for PICs (MRAG, 
2016). 
There was a consensus among the participants in our interviews that WCPFC was not able to stop the 
overharvesting and its CMA model was not working. It is obvious that the potential benefits of CMA 
found in prior studies were not realized in the case of WCPFC. There were many causes for the 
failure.  
 
Main causes for the failure 
As discussed in our literature review section, prior studies have identified eleven factors that may 
influence the outcomes of CMA, including equality of power, self-interest, cooperation, endowment, 
cultural diversity, leadership, transaction costs, incentives, clarity of rules, size of the group, and 
enforcement. We draw on the prior studies to guide our analysis and frame our discussion below. 
Given the space of this paper, we limit our discussions to the most important causes for the failure 
identified through our interviews. 
 
Power inequality and different powers 
One of the conditions agreed by members of WCPFC prior to its establishment (in 2004) was that 
power must to be equally shared among the members to ensure a consensus-based decision making 
process. However, the majority of the participants that we interviewed indicated that WCPFC 
members did not have equally shared power. A representative of a sub-regional country interviewed 
stated: 
….Yeah there is a big power inequality but it cuts both ways. The smallest countries on earth are dealing with 
the most powerful, economic thugs, they use their markets, their aid and other instruments, they can intimidate 
PICs. However, another source of power is that these fish occur in the waters of developing countries, 90% of the 
catch is taken either in the waters of PICs or in Indonesia, Philippines or in the waters adjacent to those 
countries. That gives a very great power to the PICs. This WCPFC is about that balance of power on one hand, 
PICs with their power of ownership and right of the resources, and on the other hand the economic and political 
powers of the DWFNs. That’s the game. 
We found from our interviews that the DWFNs had economic and political powers while PICs owned 
the tuna fisheries. WCPFC members used their different powers to pursue their national and sub-
regional interests. This caused them to bargain, or veto any genuine proposed conservation 
management measures. As a result, the CMA of WCPFC lost in the power struggles.   
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Competing interests 
The evidence obtained from our interviews indicated that self-interest was dominant among the 
practices of WCPFC members, although members understood the importance of common-interest (i.e., 
interest for conservation and sustainability of tuna fisheries). Two participants put it this way: 
The work of the WCPFC is extremely difficult because of the divergent interests among the 
members. This makes negotiations very difficult. 
Well, when conservation management measures are not agreed or when there is no decision on the issues, this 
certainly means there is a difference in interest…I think from a DWFNs perspective, they will continue fishing, 
continue having their businesses alive, but from a coastal state’s perspective it’s a matter of sustaining that 
resource to ensure that there is a maximum economic return, so whether it be excess fees or what so ever value 
added. Therefore, I would say perhaps the common goal would be to have sustainable fishery, there would be 
differences on what would be the economic returns, what it mean to those different perspectives.  
We found that the DWFNs wanted to gain the maximum benefits from the fishery resources, while 
PICs felt that they did not receive fair shares and were proposing an increase in the resource rent, 
which did not go down well with DWFNs. One of the participants told us ‘almost four billion dollars’ 
worth of fish was harvested in Pacific waters in 2013, but not even one-fifth of that value was returned to the 
region (the PICs)’. Thus, the main issue here was the unequal share of benefits received from the tuna 
resources among the WCPFC members. Therefore, we consider that the disagreement and competing 
interests of the members affected negatively the outcomes of WCPFC’s CMA.  
 
Cultural differences 
The WCPFC member states have diverse cultures, which was seen negatively affecting the outcomes 
of CMA in WCPFC. For example, one of the participants commented:  
Cultural differences actually hinder a lot of things….on how we manage this resource [tuna fisheries]. You take 
for example, Pacific Islanders, have to listen to chiefs when it comes to talking in meetings, they can’t talk even if 
they know the subject. However, there are other parties that do not possess the culture of being obedient; they 
make a lot of noise in the meetings when they talk. That sort of cultural thing has seeped into this management 
and has worked against us too. 
The comment indicated that the presence of power distance influenced the behaviour of members 
during their meetings. Drawing on Hofstede’s culture research, countries that are high in power 
distance tend to be submissive. This is prominent with PICs that have high respect for chiefs, leaders 
and their early colonial powers (e.g. USA, EU, and Britain). They viewed these people on the 
hierarchy end of society. Thus, they tended to keep quiet in decision-making process. In contrast, 
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those members (e.g. Australians and New Zealanders) who came from low power distance culture 
freely debated issues that concerned them. Our interview findings also indicated another distinct 
cultural difference – individualism and collectivism that hindered the way that member countries 
managed tuna resources and the CMA was enacted. For example, an official we interviewed told us: 
We, in the Pacific, are more communal in our approach, we love our community-based management. The 
Western world looks at things differently, they do their own things and do not mind others’ businesses. I think 
the perception that DWFNs have, will also affect the way we manage our resources collaboratively. They look at 
their own survivability, the economical viability, etc. Yes, I think our upbringings do have an impact on the way 
we manage our resources collaboratively.  
The remarks showed that different cultural orientations affected the behaviour of member countries 
and collaboration within WCPFC that may cause the fallout of CMA. 
Lack of self-enforcement 
Our interviews found that most participants believed based on their past experience with WCPFC that 
self-enforcement was not a viable mechanism to manage migratory tuna resources. Here are some of 
the comments made by the participants:  
 
I don’t think voluntary compliance will happen because fishing industry is based on profit, so I do not 
think voluntary compliance will be possible. 
 
…it is and will be difficult for the DWFNs to participate co-productively in this approach [self-
enforcement] because they have different interests. They are more interested in making money. So we 
still need observers to oversee their activities and to increase the capacities of external monitoring and 
surveillance. 
 
When we talk about offshore resources, we refer to migratory species that trans- boundaries, it 
is very difficult (to apply self-enforcement) because they are highly migratory. The key to 
managing such resources is monitoring and surveillance, if people feel that they own the 
resources or part of them.  
 
The above comments imply that self-enforcement will not work for organisations (or multi-
organisations) that pursue self-interest or profit making (Colebatch and Larmour 1993). From our 
interviews, we can see that it is difficult for self-enforcement to work in commercial fisheries and in a 
heterogeneous coalition where members have divergent and competing interests.  The self-
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enforcement is also not viable in open-access areas such as the high seas where ownership is often 
disputed on the fishing ground.  
 
Size of WCPFC 
In our interviews when talking about the size of the WCPFC, there was a consensus that WCPFC was 
such a large and diverse group, making it difficult for them to agree on conservation management 
measures, resulting in not being able to achieve WCPFC’s conservation goals.  
 ...as members get bigger, it gets complicated and the interests get wider, and some of these 
interests are finding other forums to creep into this WCPFC, so yes the size as it is now makes 
it more complicated than it was initially set-up.  
 
Well in terms of group dynamics [in the WCPFC], bigger groups are very hard to manage 
because the bigger the group, possibly the more interests in it. The bigger the group that would 
be hard to make decisions, the smaller possibly manageable would be good, we can identify who 
are the key stakeholders in the fisheries would be good because they play a major role in the 
fisheries. 
 
The WCPFC is made up of DWFNs and PICs who are heterogeneous, representing fishers and the 
resource owners. Our interview data show that members in such a large and heterogeneous group 
had considerable difficulty to reach consensus, such as in the conversation management measures. 
Members often had different and conflicting intentions and interests. For the DWFNs, they would 
prefer to continue with the existing financial benefits gained from the tuna resources while PICs 
wanted somewhat equal share of the cake (benefit) being the resource owners. In addition, the 
differences in the level of power among the members and different cultures affected their level of 
cooperation and consequently the outcomes of the CMA adopted by WCPFC. Furthermore, the 
differences among the members affected trust among them in that PICs did not think DWFNs or 
fishers can self-enforce due to increasing IUU fishing activities in the region (MRAG, 2016).  
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This study advances the existing literature and understanding of common pool resources 
management in general, and migratory tuna resources management in particular. Tuna migrate from 
one national boundary to another within the Western Central Pacific Ocean and are mostly fished by 
DWFNs. By studying the WCPFC comprising of the PICs and DWFNs, this research extends the 
understanding of the management of CPRs from one single geographical area to multiple 
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geographical areas, and includes the analysis of the motivations and conducts of international actors. 
This study also contributes to the extant research of collaborative management approach by exploring 
empirically the key factors that affect the outcomes of CMA through a case study. The findings from 
this study should contribute to future theoretical development of a new model to advance common-
pool resource management research.  
In addition to the contribution to extant body of knowledge, our study makes practical contributions 
because tuna resources in the WCPO are vital to the economy and the sustainable development of the 
region. Compared to other ocean regions, WCPO supplied more than 50 percent of the tuna resources 
to the global markets (World Bank, 2016). The findings of this study are expected to inform policy-
makers in the WCPO region about the key issues that the current management approach (CMA) has 
raised and help them develop policies and strategies to address the issues.    
CONCLUSIONS 
Earlier studies have asserted that the use of CMAs is the most suitable way to manage CPRs such as 
tuna fisheries and resources (e.g. Acheson 2013; Huezer et al. 2012). However, our research has shown 
that the CMA does not appear to instil the sense of ownership among WCPFC members that is needed 
to encourage and develop sustainability and collective benefits of the fisheries, as argued by scholars 
such as Acheson (2013); Huezer et al. (2012). Our research demonstrates that a CMA is not necessarily 
effective for groups (that includes stakeholders, multi-governments, and multi-national organisations) 
that are highly heterogeneous, especially those that involve international actors (cross-country and 
cross-cultural), such as a combination of developed, developing and least developed countries. Their 
significant differences, competing interests, and different economical aspirations appear often to lead 
them to base their decisions at the expense of collective objectives and collaborative institutions. The 
findings of our research lead to a conclusion that it would be difficult for the WCPFC in its current 
form to be an effective institution capable of managing and sustaining the tuna fisheries in the WCPF 
region. Consequently, the problem of overfishing will continue and, regrettably, the depletion of tuna 
species is likely to continue. 
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